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[67] 
Liability for Unconscious Discrimination? 
A Thought Experiment in the Theory of 
Employment Discrimination Law 
Patrick S. Shin 
Recent scholarship in employment discrimination law has wrestled with the problem of 
unconscious bias and its implications for antidiscrimination law. This Article addresses 
what some might regard as a naïve question: Should actions influenced by unconscious 
bias be regarded as discrimination under Title VII? The question might be considered 
naïve because any proposal for liability based on unconscious bias would surely be 
unripe for present implementation, and because there is no accepted method either for 
detecting such bias in individual cases, or for determining whether such bias actually 
influenced a person’s decisionmaking. But these practical considerations provide no 
answer to the fundamental issue that underlies the question. Does unconsciously biased 
action fall within the legal concept of actionable discrimination? To reach that 
important issue, I devise a thought experiment that brackets practical problems of 
proof and squarely raises what I regard as the hard question for theorizing about 
unconscious discrimination. Should an employment action give rise to liability when 
that action was provably affected by the actor’s unconscious bias with respect to a 
statutorily protected classification, even when the actor consciously acted only on 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons? The payoff of the thought experiment is not 
only a clearer picture of the theoretical commitments entailed by liability based on 
unconscious bias, but also a keener understanding of our currently prevailing notions 
of actionable discrimination. 
 
  Associate Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School; Ph.D., 
Philosophy, Harvard University. I owe thanks to Larry Alexander, Frank Cooper, Mitu Gulati, Bernie 
Jones, Kim Krawiec, Helen Norton, Andy Perlman, Gowri Ramachandran, Al Roberts, Sam 
Sommers, and Bob Smith for their helpful questions and suggestions, and also to Casey Lyons and 
Alyssa Minsky for their excellent research assistance. 
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A steadily mounting body of social science research provides strong 
evidence that our intentional actions are often influenced by 
psychological factors that are not present to our introspective 
awareness—for example, “implicit” or unconscious biases.1 One direct 
implication of this research is that ascertaining a person’s conscious 
 
 1. For a review of the literature, see Katherine Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The 
Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1893, 1904–
20 (2009), and Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 945 (2006). 
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motives for an action may not always provide a complete explanation of 
why she did it. The most comprehensive explanation of an action might 
require positing the influence of a psychological factor that played no 
part in the actor’s conscious deliberations. Thus, an actor’s decision to 
take a particular adverse action against one individual rather than 
another might be best understood as having been affected by the actor’s 
awareness of the race of those individuals, even if the actor could 
sincerely disavow any conscious consideration of race as a reason for the 
decision. 
The possibility of this sort of scenario—cases in which an 
objectionable bias affects an action without entering the actor’s own 
awareness—presents a worrisome impediment to the achievement of 
justice in the workplace. There have been numerous deeply insightful 
articles describing the problem of implicit bias and discussing its 
implications for antidiscrimination law.2 My purpose in this Article is to 
focus directly on what might be called a naïve question of liability: should 
implicit bias be a basis of disparate treatment liability under Title VII?3 
The question might fairly be regarded as naïve insofar as any proposal 
for such liability would surely be unripe for present implementation in 
light of serious issues pertaining to problems of proof in individual cases, 
not to mention intramural disputes among experts about the proper 
practical inferences that can be drawn from studies of implicit bias. My 
interest, however, is more fundamental. I want to understand whether 
and how the notion of unconsciously biased action should figure into our 
current legal conception of actionable discrimination. This is a 
thoroughly normative, not a scientific or epistemological, question.4 
The question of this Article, then, is whether employment actions 
causally affected by implicit bias should ipso facto be regarded as 
 
 2. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 5–7 (2006); Bartlett, supra note 1; Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in 
Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 91 (2003); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 
969 (2006); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action,” 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1063 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our 
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 
47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1995); Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva la Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive 
in Title VII, 9 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 415 (2000); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent 
Discrimination, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 899 (1993); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment 
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458 (2001); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination 
as Accident, 74 Ind. L.J. 1129 (1999). 
 3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
 4. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 Harv. L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 477, 491 (2007) (“Science does not defeat the implicit bias law-reform program, but science 
does not establish the case for that program, either. That program depends on a normative judgment 
that discrimination is not about fault but about a social problem—a normative judgment that is deeply 
contested among judges and policymakers.”). 
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actionably discriminatory, even when the actor genuinely and reasonably 
believed that the action was justified by nondiscriminatory 
considerations. Part of what is really at stake in the question of liability 
for unconsciously biased action is an implicit judgment about the relative 
priority that should be given to the sufficiency of an agent’s non-
pretextual rationale for the action, versus socio-psychological 
explanations that deemphasize the importance of that deliberative 
perspective and focus instead on the action’s causal etiology. I argue that 
the most significant conceptual shift entailed by liability for truly 
“unconscious discrimination” is not the shift from a fault-based to a 
consequence-based standard of liability (the shift on which others have 
focused),5 but from an agent-relative, justificatory conception to what 
might be described as a diagnostic, causally-oriented understanding of 
what constitutes discriminatory action. I contend that this shift would 
represent a significant departure from, rather than an incremental 
expansion of, current conceptions of discrimination, and I discuss 
concerns about whether a causal conception of discrimination might 
diminish the moral significance of the charge of discrimination and 
whether it may create a deep instability for any distinction between 
individual discriminatory action and “societal” discrimination. 
II.  Isolating the Hard Question 
The question whether employment discrimination laws should allow 
for liability on a theory of implicit bias is, in a sense, purely academic. It 
is not clear that practicable, scientifically accepted methods for proving 
that a particular individual harbors implicit bias, or for establishing that 
any particular action in non-laboratory conditions was affected by such 
bias, currently exist.6 This is not to deny the convincing evidence of 
implicit bias (although it is not entirely uncontroversial to claim that 
measures of implicit bias, like the Harvard Implicit Association Test 
(IAT),7 are actually predictive of any real-world action).8 But it is one 
 
 5. See id. 
 6. See Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 979, 981–86 
(2008). 
 7. See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 6 (describing the test). 
 8. For analysis in support of the predictive value of the IAT, see Anthony G. Greenwald et al., 
Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 17 (2009). For a study that raises some critical questions, see Andrew 
Karpinksi & James L. Hilton, Attitudes and the Implicit Association Test, 81 J. Personality & Soc. 
Psychol. 774 (2001). For an overtly skeptical perspective, see Hal R. Arkes & Philip E. Tetlock, 
Attributions of Implicit Prejudice, or “Would Jesse Jackson ‘Fail’ the Implicit Association Test?,” 15 
Psychol. Inquiry 257, 264, 270 (2004) (objecting to reaction time data on implicit bias on the grounds 
that it may reflect cultural stereotypes instead of prejudice, negative responses may be due to 
emotions unrelated to prejudice, and that sometimes data showing prejudice can also show rational 
behavior), and Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of 
Mindreading, 67 Ohio St. L.J. 1023, 1023 (2006) (arguing that research on implicit bias needs to 
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thing to accept the research that supports the hypothesis that people act 
from biases of which they are not consciously aware; it is arguably quite 
another to adduce proof sufficient to establish that unconscious bias 
affected a specific act of decisionmaking in the complex setting of the 
workplace, even in the face of the actor’s genuine disavowals.9 
Thus, it would not be unfair to take the position that the question 
whether the employment discrimination laws should allow for liability 
based on proof of implicit bias is unripe for practical and meaningful 
discussion at present.10 This difficulty would seem to counsel strongly in 
favor of reform proposals that address the problem of implicit bias 
without trying to make it a basis for liability under Title VII or other 
antidiscrimination statutes.11 For example, in their well-known article, 
Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji argue that implicit bias research 
provides a basis for the use of affirmative action as a way to introduce 
“debiasing” agents into the workplace,12 but they are careful to disclaim 
any argument for outright liability.13 
More generally, the current impracticability of a liability scheme 
premised on implicit bias might be thought to obviate any inquiry about 
whether such liability could be justified. But I think that is the wrong 
conclusion to draw. In fact, the concern about the unripeness of the 
question of liability implies a distinction between the practical and the 
theoretical question. The point of the concern is that the practical 
difficulties provide reason to put off addressing the theoretical issue of 
liability. The concern implicitly acknowledges the existence of a further 
question, masked by problems of scientific validity, evidentiary proof, 
and doctrinal implementation.14 What I want to do is to bracket those 
 
include a more “rigorous investigation of . . . error rates,” an analysis of the predictive utility of 
measuring implicit bias in the workplace, and a discussion of social consequences of changing 
requirements for proving bias). See generally Bruce Bower, The Bias Finders, 169 Sci. News 250 (2006) 
(reporting disagreement among psychologists about what exactly can be inferred from IAT findings). 
 9. See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment 
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 997, 1034–36 (2006). 
 10. Cf. Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 Ala. L. 
Rev. 741, 774–77 (2005) (discussing practical difficulties); Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 8, at 1067–70 
(asserting the claimed link between unconscious discrimination and discriminatory behavior have 
“little legal significance”); Franita Tolson, The Boundaries of Litigating Unconscious Discrimination: 
Firm-Based Remedies in Response to a Hostile Judiciary, 33 Del. J. Corp. L. 347, 421 (2008) (observing 
practical challenges to solutions proposed by scholars). 
 11. For examples of such proposals, see Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological 
Research Related to Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional 
Discrimination, 73 Mo. L. Rev. 83, 108–28 (2008) (suggesting procedural litigation reforms to help 
account for implicit bias), Green, supra note 2, at 144–56 (calling for “structural” workplace reform as 
a response to the problem of implicit bias), and Sturm, supra note 2, at 479–522, 553–61 (same). 
 12. Kang & Banaji, supra note 2, at 1108–15. 
 13. Id. at 1077 (“We are not arguing that implicit bias-induced discrimination should produce the same 
legal liability as explicit animus-driven discrimination under current . . . federal antidiscrimination statutes.”). 
 14. Cf. Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 492 (arguing that some forms of skepticism about the legal 
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practical difficulties in order to reach the normative issue of whether the 
employment discrimination laws should be understood to encompass 
liability for actions tainted by unconscious bias. 
A. Two Assumptions 
To that end, I am going to assume the truth of some controversial 
hypotheses. In doing so, I do not mean to dismiss disagreement about 
them as unimportant or illusory. The purpose of these assumptions is to 
isolate and expose the central normative questions about how the law 
should regard actions affected by implicit bias. My intent is to 
disentangle my arguments from debates that can only play out in the 
social scientific realm. The payoff of this discussion, I hope, will be not 
only a clearer picture of the theoretical commitments entailed by liability 
based on unconscious bias, but a keener understanding of our currently 
prevailing notion of actionable discrimination. 
1. The First Assumption 
The first controversial hypothesis that I am going to assume to be 
true is that unconscious or implicit bias is real. To avoid any 
misunderstanding about exactly what this assumption is supposed to 
mean,15 I shall take some time to explain. At a minimum, the assumption 
implies that people can have psychological states or dispositions of which 
they are not conscious,16 including unconscious dispositions affecting 
actual behavior.17 I take this to entail that it is possible for a true and 
accurate description of a person’s psychological dispositions to include 
preferences or other proclivities of which the person is unaware and is 
unable to make himself aware.18 It also means that it is possible for a 
 
implications of implicit bias research are really normative arguments about the scope of actionable 
discrimination, and therefore calling for “a renewed attention to antidiscrimination theory”). 
 15. For an expansive and insightful examination of the meaning of “unconscious” and the 
question whether the unconscious “exists,” see Michael S. Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking 
the Relationship 126–47, 249–80 (1984). 
 16. I do not venture any claim about the metaphysics of psychological or mental states, and I 
daresay my discussion does not depend on any particular thesis about the nature of the relation 
between mental states and physical brain states. 
 17. Here, again, I wish to avoid any entanglement in philosophical debates about the metaphysics 
of mental causation. I hope it will suffice to stipulate that I am taking a broadly functionalist approach 
to the nature of mental states—an approach under which we can understand mental or psychological 
states in terms of their functional roles in thought and behavior, independent of any underlying thesis 
about how such states might be realized in or reduced to physical brain states. See Moore, supra note 
15, at 35. 
 18. I add “unable to make himself aware” to distinguish mental states of which a person might 
not presently be conscious, but of which the person could become aware if she made an effort to direct 
her attention to them. This sort of temporarily latent mental state, for example, a suppressed state of 
hunger, is not unconscious in the sense that makes implicit bias problematic. Cf. id. at 130 (using the 
Freudian term “preconscious” to refer to this simple sense of “unconscious”). In the sense of 
unconscious that is relevant to the problem of implicit bias, to say that we had certain unconscious 
mental states means that “we are not able to recall them at all, even if we do direct considerable 
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person to act from a particular disposition without being aware, and 
without being able to become aware, that she has acted from that 
disposition.19 
The assumption that implicit bias is “real” implies, more specifically, 
that a person can have an unconscious psychological disposition that 
comprises or results in a bias toward certain types of individuals as 
compared to others. That is, a person can have an unconscious 
psychological state that comprises or results in a disposition to act more 
favorably toward individuals with certain characteristics than individuals 
without those characteristics—which is to say that those characteristics 
can influence that person’s actions such that she would act differently in 
the absence of that influence. Finally, and crucially, the assumption 
implies that a person may act from this kind of unconscious disposition 
even when she could genuinely disavow consideration of the disposing 
characteristic.20 In other words, the person’s action might be influenced 
by that characteristic without the actor being aware of that influence.21 
I will use the term “unconscious discrimination” to refer to this sort 
of hypothesized case—in other words, where an agent acts from an 
unconscious bias inaccessible to her own awareness—and in which the 
disposing characteristic at issue is one that is a statutorily forbidden basis 
for employment action (race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, 
disability).22 The assumption that implicit bias is real means, therefore, 
that unconscious discrimination is possible. 
To make this more concrete, consider the example of unconscious 
discrimination on account of race. What does it mean to say that race-
based implicit bias is “real” and that unconscious discrimination because 
of race is possible? What I take this to mean is that some people have 
unconscious biases that dispose them to act more favorably to members 
of certain races than to members of others, and, furthermore, that these 
unconscious racial biases sometimes actually affect how people act.23 
 
attention to the question of what they were.” Id. at 131. 
 19. Michael Moore suggests, in a similar vein, that one thing that we might mean when we say 
that a person has a particular “unconscious mental state” is “that the holder of the mental state does 
not have the capacity to recognize the state that he is in; he cannot describe it even if he attempts to 
direct his attention to it.” Id. at 129. 
 20. For a discussion of empirical support for this possibility, see David L. Faigman et al., A Matter 
of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59 Hastings L.J. 1389, 1404–06 
(2008) (“[S]elf-generated explanations of one’s own thought processes are often no more accurate 
than that of outside observers who have little knowledge of the mental content of another person.”). 
 21. For a concise overview of the social science research providing evidence of the prevalence of 
this sort of “dissociation” between self-professed attitudes and behavior, see Gary Blasi, Default 
Discrimination: Law, Science, and Unintended Discrimination in the New Workplace, in 3 NYU 
Selected Essays on Labor and Employment Law: Behavioral Analyses of Workplace 
Discrimination 3, 6–12 (Mitu Gulati & Michael J. Yelnosky eds., 2007). 
 22. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
 23. Michael Selmi has noted that the term “unconscious discrimination” is vague and could 
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What does it mean for an unconscious racial bias to actually affect how a 
person acts? The most straightforward case would be an agent taking an 
action with respect to an individual of a particular race that the agent 
would not have taken if only the individual was of a different race—thus 
constituting bias. Yet, an honest report by the agent of the considerations 
on which she believed she acted would not include the individual’s race 
(this is the warrant for regarding the bias as unconscious). 
The assumption that unconscious bias is real entails a claim about 
the possible motivation of action generally. This claim is that an agent’s 
actions are sometimes influenced by biases of which the agent is 
unaware. If the claim is true, there seems little reason to doubt that 
unconscious bias affects actions by decisionmakers in a wide variety of 
contexts,24 including the workplace. From the perspective of employment 
discrimination laws, the potential concern is evident. Employment 
actions, no less than any other kind of action, might be influenced by 
decision makers’ unconscious biases relating to race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, age, or disability—the considerations excluded from 
permissible consideration under Title VII,25 the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA),26 and Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).27 The question that interests me is whether 
actions that suffer from this sort of bias—acts of unconscious 
discrimination—fit within the concept of actionable discrimination 
embedded in these legal frameworks. 
2. The Second Assumption 
The second big assumption of this Article is that unconscious 
discrimination is provable—in other words, that the influence of implicit 
bias on an agent’s action is something that can, in principle, be proved in 
individual cases.28 This assumption is presently probably closer to science 
fiction than a plausible supposition, given what I understand to be the 
 
potentially be used to refer to any kind of “subtle” discrimination not manifested in the form of overt 
racism. See Michael Selmi, Response to Professor Wax: Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New 
Bottle, 74 Ind. L.J. 1233, 1236 (1999). I am not using the term in this loose way, but rather to refer 
specifically to differential treatment influenced by the psychological operation of implicit bias of which 
the actor is unaware. 
 24. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of 
Cognitive Science, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1587, 1603–05 (2006); Antony Page & Michael J. Pitts, Poll 
Workers, Election Administration, and the Problem of Implicit Bias, 15 Mich. J. Race & L. 1, 21–33 
(2009); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor’s Perspective: Race of the Discretionary 
Actors, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1811, 1818–19 (1998); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group 
Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 597, 606–09 (2006). 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 26. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006). 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006 & Supp. II). 
 28. To put it another way, I assume that the influencing effect of implicit bias on action is a 
“datable event.” 
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current state of the relevant sciences.29 Be that as it may, I am going to 
suppose that it is, in principle, possible to detect or rule out the influence 
of unconscious bias with respect to any given action by an individual 
agent, the agent’s genuine disavowals notwithstanding.30 I will imagine, 
more specifically, that it is in principle possible to determine whether, in 
a given case, the agent’s unconscious bias was such that it caused the 
agent to act differently than she would have in the absence of the bias. In 
short, I am assuming that the truth of a claim that a particular action 
constituted unconscious discrimination is something that can be 
determined, on a preponderance of the evidence, through empirical 
methods of proof.31 
This second assumption, much more than the first, will obviously 
require a temporary suspension of practical skepticism. As I said at the 
outset, the point of the assumption is not to deny or minimize the 
possibility that it might in fact be false. It is, rather, to enable us to drill 
down to the basic normative issue of liability that might otherwise be 
clouded by worries about practical implementation. 
B. A Hypothetical Test Case: “Work Experience” 
I want to construct a hypothetical set of facts that puts my two 
assumptions to work and provides us with a concrete case that squarely 
presents what I have been characterizing as the basic normative issue of 
liability for unconscious discrimination. I will refer to this scenario as the 
“Work Experience” case. 
An employer wants to hire someone for a managerial position. The 
employer has to decide between two candidates. Both are qualified and 
 
 29. See Blasi, supra note 21, at 10–11; Wax, supra note 6, at 985–86. 
 30. If one likes, one might imagine that a battery of psychological tests and brain-imaging 
techniques could be developed for this purpose. Cf. Blasi, supra note 21, at 10 (describing studies 
linking perception of racial difference with certain patterns of brain activation). 
 31. On this assumption, unconscious bias is a discrete, detectable psychological phenomenon, as 
opposed to a conceptual construct that merely stands in for the inexplicability of an action under more 
intentional descriptions. The difference between these types of views is given some elaboration by 
Alasdair MacIntyre in his discussion of Freud’s theory of the unconscious. See A.C. MacIntyre, The 
Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis 50–79 (1958). As MacIntyre puts it, “Either the unconscious is 
an inaccessible realm of inaccessible entities existing in its own right or it is a theoretical and 
unobservable entity introduced to explain and relate a number of otherwise inexplicable phenomena.” 
Id. at 71. In his discussion of MacIntyre’s view of Freud, Thomas D. D’Andrea nicely summarizes the 
latter type of view of the unconscious in this way:  
[T]he unconscious . . . represents simply an abductive inference to a better explanation of 
the causes of certain forms of overt human behaviour. In positing an unconscious mind (or 
unconscious processes at least) . . . Freud’s inference . . . conforms to a standard pattern of 
scientific explanation: one which seeks to link observable to observable via an unobservable 
process.  
Thomas D. D’Andrea, Tradition, Rationality, and Virtue: The Thought of Alasdair MacIntyre 
167 (2006). For further philosophical discussion about the possible meanings of “unconscious,” see 
Moore, supra note 15, at 126–42. 
Shin_62-HLJ-67.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2011 12:06 PM 
76 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:67 
have roughly comparable credentials, except that one applicant, who is 
black, performed slightly better in the job interview, while the other 
applicant, who is white, has slightly more work experience. In her own 
private deliberations about which applicant would be the best 
candidate for the job, the employer decides that work experience is the 
most important factor. The employer therefore chooses the white 
applicant. Although the employer is aware of each applicant’s race, she 
honestly believes that her choice was based on the white applicant’s 
superior work experience, and she can honestly deny any conscious 
consideration of the candidates’ race in her decisionmaking. However, 
despite the employer’s honest belief, her decision was in fact 
influenced by unconscious bias in favor of whites and against blacks. 
More specifically, if it had been the black applicant who had more 
work experience and the white applicant who had done better in the 
interview, the employer would still have selected the white applicant, 
but she would have done so on the basis of her superior performance in 
the interview;32 and she would have genuinely believed that this was the 
basis of her choice. 
The truth of the matter in the “Work Experience” case is, in short, 
that the employer had an unconscious disposition to disfavor the black 
applicant. She acted from that disposition, all the while believing that she 
was acting on a reason that had nothing to do with the race of the 
applicants, when, in fact, her professed reason for action was really just a 
secondary, epiphenomenal rationalization that effectively shielded her 
own bias from introspective discovery. Yet, the employer’s professed 
reliance on the chosen applicant’s credentials is not a conscious cover or 
pretext for discrimination, because she genuinely believed it was her 
reason for acting. But, by hypothesis, it is the subconscious influence of 
the employer’s awareness of the race of the applicants that actually 
explains her action. 
In conjunction with these facts, let us imagine also that testing 
methods or other modes of proof exist that allow us to determine that 
despite the employer’s good faith disavowal of bias, and despite her 
subjective belief that she acted on a perfectly legitimate consideration in 
choosing the white candidate, her awareness of the race of the black 
applicant did in fact (more likely than not) influence her decision to 
select the white candidate instead, such that the employer would have 
selected the white candidate over the black one even if their application 
dossiers had been switched.33 
 
 32. This hypothetical scenario is loosely inspired by actual research studies. See Michael I. Norton 
et al., Mixed Motives and Racial Bias: The Impact of Legitimate and Illegitimate Criteria on Decision 
Making, 12 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 36, 41–42 (2006); Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, 
Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit to Justify Discrimination, 16 Psychol. Sci. 474, 475, 477–78 
(2005). 
 33. Larry Alexander constructs a similar hypothetical case of unconscious race-based preference 
in the context of a broad and comprehensive discussion of the moral wrongness of discrimination 
generally. See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, 
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The foregoing hypothesized facts establish a scenario in which an 
employer’s selection of a job candidate is provably affected by 
unconscious bias. My two assumptions allow us to discuss this scenario 
without getting mired in internecine disputes about implicit bias or 
practical proof problems. Important matters, to be sure, but setting them 
aside allows us to see clearly the hard question for theorizing about 
unconscious discrimination: Should an employment action—like our 
hypothetical employer’s selection of the white job candidate—give rise to 
employment discrimination liability when the action was provably 
affected by the actor’s unconscious bias with respect to a statutorily 
protected classification, even when the actor consciously acted only on 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons? This is the hard question because 
it lays bare the question of how the law should respond to provable 
unconscious discrimination. Given the imagined facts in the “Work 
Experience” case, should the employer be subject to liability under the 
employment discrimination laws? 
III.  Legal Background 
I approach the question primarily as a normative, theoretical one. 
But before moving to that question, This Part briefly discusses how a 
claim of unconscious discrimination might fare under current case law 
and whether such a claim would fit the relevant statutory text. 
A. Case Law 
An argument for liability on the hypothesized facts of the “Work 
Experience” case probably would not succeed under currently accepted 
judicial frameworks of analysis. First, it is unlikely that our hypothetical 
black job candidate would prevail on a disparate treatment claim under 
Title VII,34 which requires a showing of discriminatory intent or motive.35 
 
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 149, 180 (1992). Alexander’s imagined case involves a 
sports fan whose unconscious bias causes his allegiances to shift toward whichever hometown team 
happens to be the most predominantly white, even though he does not believe he is biased and in fact 
“rejects all biased judgments at the conscious level.” See id. 
 34. The basic statutory cause of action for discrimination on a theory of disparate treatment is 
provided in § 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). The framework 
for analyzing the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim under the statute is set forth in the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973), and its progeny. See, e.g., 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142–43 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. 
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506–12 (1993); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–56 
(1981). 
 35. Justice O’Connor stated this point unequivocally in Reeves, although the significance of 
unconscious bias was not an issue in that case: “The ultimate question in every employment 
discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of 
intentional discrimination.” 530 U.S. at 153; see also Blasi, supra note 21, at 17 (“The fundamental 
schema of anti-discrimination laws is borrowed from the law of intentional torts: plaintiff victims of 
discrimination are permitted to sue defendant employers for damages if they can establish disparate 
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More specifically, the rejected candidate might be able to make out a 
prima facie case,36 but the employer’s assertion that the hiring of the 
white applicant was based on consideration of the applicant’s work 
experience would constitute a nondiscriminatory rationale that would 
rebut the inference of discrimination generated by the prima facie case.37 
Ultimately, the plaintiff’s success would depend on proof that the 
defendant’s stated reason was merely a pretext for discrimination.38 On 
the assumed facts of the “Work Experience” case, however, that proof 
would not be possible, as we are stipulating that the employer can 
honestly assert that she consciously based her decision on a comparative 
evaluation of work experience.39 In short, our hypothetical employer is 
not subject to liability on any conventional theory of intentional 
discrimination.40 This should hardly be surprising41 and, indeed, is part of 
 
treatment ‘because of’ the employee’s race, sex, or other protected category.”). For arguments that 
disparate treatment liability does not necessarily require proof of conscious discriminatory intent, see 
infra note 41. 
 36. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977) (explaining that in 
general, the requirement of the prima facie case merely requires plaintiff to demonstrate that the 
challenged employment action did not result from plaintiff’s lack of qualifications or the absence of a 
job vacancy); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (stating that the prima 
facie case should be understood flexibly). 
 37. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. 
 38. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511. 
 39. See, e.g., Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 13–14 (1st Cir. 1995) (applying the McDonnell Douglas 
framework to reject plaintiff’s claim on grounds that plaintiff failed to establish that improper motive 
resulted in the layoff and therefore, that plaintiff’s evidence did not support an inference of 
discrimination); see also Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: 
Locating Employer Wrong, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 849, 877–80 (2007); Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 980. 
See generally Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 2002); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 9, 
at 1034–38 (describing and criticizing the “honest belief” rule). 
 40. Nor is there any basis, on the hypothesized facts, for disparate treatment liability under a 
“pattern or practice” theory, under which an inference of discriminatory intent could be drawn from 
statistically significant racial patterns in an employer’s hiring or promotion practices. See Hazelwood 
Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309–12 (1977); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339–40. It is unclear 
whether the imagined facts of “Work Experience” would be sufficient to make it a “mixed motives” 
case subject to the “motivating factor” liability standard articulated in § 703(m) of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). However, I would think that a court that understood 
the case law to require proof of conscious consideration of a protected characteristic as a basis for 
disparate treatment liability would probably interpret the “motivating factor” language of § 703(m) to 
refer to conscious motives. This is simply a claim about how I would expect most courts to read the 
statute if the issue of unconscious discrimination were squarely presented. As I argue below in Part 
III.B., the literal statutory text of Title VII arguably does not require such a reading and, in fact, seems 
open to the possibility of liability based on unconscious bias. 
 41. Some commentators have argued that the cases do not clearly support the claim that disparate 
treatment claims depend on proof of conscious bias, animus, or consideration of a protected 
characteristic. In an article published in 2000, Ann McGinley proposed a reading of the case law under 
which unconscious bias could constitute pretext where the employer’s decisionmaker is “mistaken” 
about the relevant facts, such as the qualifications of the affected employees or job candidates. See 
McGinley, supra note 2, at 453–56. Katharine Bartlett has also argued that the cases do not uniformly 
support the claim that disparate treatment claims depend on proof of discriminatory intent in the 
sense of conscious bias or animus. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 1922–24. 
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the point of our imagined scenario.42 
Second, it is similarly unlikely that the rejected black candidate in 
the “Work Experience” case would have a conventional disparate impact 
claim. Although Title VII disparate impact claims, unlike disparate 
treatment claims, do not require proof of discriminatory intent,43 they do 
require that the plaintiff identify “a particular employment practice”44 
that creates a significant disparate impact.45 In our example, neither of 
those elements is present. It is (for all we know) a singular case of 
adverse treatment not tied to any particular employment practice as 
such,46 and there is no observed disparate impact apart from the effect of 
the employer’s decision on the two managerial candidates under 
discussion. It might be possible that the aggregate consequences of the 
employer’s discretionary decisionmaking procedure over time would 
reflect a pattern that could support a disparate impact claim,47 but that 
possibility depends on facts that go beyond my hypothetical. The 
question is not whether we could add further facts that would support a 
claim of discrimination, but whether the hypothesized singular decision 
 
 42. There is some authority, at least in the First Circuit, that unconscious reliance on 
discriminatory stereotypes may be sufficient to establish the discriminatory intent required for a 
disparate treatment claim. See Swallow v. Fetzer Vineyards, 46 F. App’x 636, 644 (1st Cir. 2002); 
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 138 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir. 1999); Small v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 584 F. 
Supp. 2d 284, 294 (D. Mass. 2008) (stating that circumstantial evidence could be used to show pretext). 
It seems to me an interesting question whether the notion of an unconscious reliance on a racial 
stereotype is different from implicit bias generally. Cf. Selmi, supra note 23, at 1241 (suggesting that 
not all stereotypes may influence behavior). I would note that a discriminatory stereotype is typically 
perceived of as an illegitimate belief about attributes of members of the stereotyped class. Thus, the 
concept of unconsciously acting on a stereotype may centrally involve the idea of an unconscious 
belief. Depending on our understanding of belief, this sort of unconscious bias seems arguably 
distinguishable from, or at least a special case of, unconscious bias as I have conceptualized it, namely, 
as a functional state or disposition, as opposed to a cognitive state with propositional content. See 
supra notes 15–21 and accompanying text. In any event, the unconscious stereotype cases are not 
particularly apposite to the present discussion, because the facts of “Work Experience” are not meant 
to suggest that the employer’s action there is based on any reliance, unconscious or otherwise, on any 
stereotype as such. For further discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 85–90. 
 43. As Justice Kennedy explained in his opinion for the Court in Ricci v. DeStefano, “Title VII 
prohibits both intentional discrimination (known as ‘disparate treatment’) as well as, in some cases, 
practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately adverse effect on 
minorities (known as ‘disparate impact’).” 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009); see also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 
335–36 n.15 (explaining the difference between disparate treatment and disparate impact claims). 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 45. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678 (characterizing the prima facie case of disparate impact liability to 
require “essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity”); Watson v. Fort Worth 
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994–95 (1988); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982). 
 46. The statute excuses the plaintiff from showing that a particular employment practice caused 
the disparate impact at issue in certain circumstances not relevant here. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(B)(i) (“[I]f the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a 
respondent’s decision-making process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking 
process may be analyzed as one employment practice.”). 
 47. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 989–96; cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309 n.44 
(1978). 
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to select the white candidate instead of the black candidate in the “Work 
Experience” case itself constitutes actionable discrimination. 
B. The Literal Statutory Argument for Liability 
Although my central concern is with the normative question of 
liability for unconscious discrimination, it is worth pausing, to make an 
observation about the statutory language that forms the basis for the 
disparate treatment cause of action under Title VII. I stated above that 
an argument for liability on the facts of the “Work Experience” 
hypothetical would be implausible under current case law. Such an 
argument does not seem to be foreclosed, however, by the literal 
language of Title VII.48 If one were to approach the statute afresh rather 
than through the lens of Supreme Court precedent, one might very well 
read it to permit the imposition of liability for unconscious bias.49 
The central liability provision of Title VII says that it is unlawful “to 
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”50 Liability is thus predicated on 
“discriminat[ion] . . . because of” a protected characteristic.51 This 
language implies that in order for liability to be imposed, there must be a 
particular sort of relation between the adverse employment action in 
question (the “discrimination”) and a protected characteristic of the 
aggrieved individual, such as race—to wit, a relation captured by the 
phrase “because of.”52 
The term “discriminate” is undefined in Title VII. The statutory 
language does not expressly say that an action must involve conscious 
consideration of a factor before it can constitute discrimination because 
 
 48. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 1922; Wax, supra note 6, at 982–84; cf. McGinley, supra note 2, at 
447; Wax, supra note 2, at 1146. 
 49. My argument shows that liability for unconscious discrimination is not precluded by the 
relevant statutory text. I make no claim about what Congress might have intended with regarded to 
unconscious discrimination. 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 51. Id. The relevant language of the ADEA is similar. See Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to . . . discriminate against any 
individual . . . because of such individual’s age.”). Interestingly, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 originally contained the same “because of” language in its general liability provision, but as part 
of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, that “because of” language was replaced with the phrase “on 
the basis of.” See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5(a), 122 Stat. 3553 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)). 
 52. Similarly, § 703(b) of Title VII, which is sometimes understood to provide textual support for 
disparate impact liability, makes it unlawful for an employer “to limit, segregate, or classify his 
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) 
(emphasis added). 
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of that factor. Although at times courts seem to suggest that 
discrimination as such is inherently intentional,53 those claims tend to be 
made in the context of distinguishing actionable discrimination from 
differential treatment that is merely correlated with a proscribed 
consideration,54 not in the context of distinguishing the legal significance 
of unconscious rather than conscious bias. Indeed, since it is 
uncontroversially true that Title VII’s conception of discrimination 
encompasses liability for disparate impact, which does not depend upon 
any showing of intentional consideration of any protected classification, 
it seems impossible to read the term “discriminate” to preclude actions 
influenced by unconscious bias. 
The semantics of the “because of” construction seem similarly open 
to the possibility of liability for unconscious discrimination. In ordinary 
usage, when we say that a person acted “because of” some factor, we are 
saying that the factor explains why the person so acted. But there is 
nothing in the “because of” construction that necessarily implies that the 
explanation must be in terms of the person’s conscious intention: the 
construction “A did x because of y” does not necessarily imply that y was 
A’s conscious rationale for doing x.55 It only implies, in ordinary usage, 
that y is a consideration that helps explain A’s doing of x, a consideration 
that tells us something about why A did x.56 No semantic distortion is 
required to assert that the employer in our hypothetical “Work 
Experience” case chose the white candidate “because of” race. The literal 
terms of § 703(a) of Title VII, which prohibit “discriminat[ion] . . . because 
of ”57 a protected characteristic, need not be read to apply only in cases 
where an employer’s action is explained by the conscious consideration 
of race or another protected characteristic.58 
 
 53. See, e.g., United States v. North Carolina, 914 F. Supp. 1257, 1265 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (“The 
concept of ‘unintentional discrimination’ is logically impossible.”). 
 54. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611–12 (1993). 
 55. Consider the sentence, “Smith flew to Florida because of y.” To be sure, y might be some 
factor, like the warm weather, that Smith consciously considered. But it would make just as much 
sense for y to be something wholly outside Smith’s conscious deliberation—for example, “Smith flew 
to Florida because he boarded the wrong plane;” or even, “Smith flew to Florida because he was 
under the spell of an evil demon.” Furthermore, there is nothing about the “because of” construction 
that implies that the proposition “A did x because of y” must hold true for one and only one 
specification of y. It might be true, for example, that Smith went to Florida because he wanted to be in 
warm weather; but it might at the same time be true that Smith went to Florida because it evokes 
pleasant memories of childhood vacations with his parents. 
 56. In a recent case interpreting the “because of” construction as it appears in the ADEA, Justice 
Thomas asserted that “because of” entails a but-for causal relation. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 
129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350–51 (2009). It is true that specifying a causal relation between x and y is one way 
of explaining x in terms of y. But as I argue below, it is not the only way. 
 57.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 58. There are some reported decisions in which courts have suggested that an employer cannot be 
held liable for discriminating against an employee “because of” a protected characteristic unless the 
employer was actually aware that the employee possessed that characteristic. See, e.g., Geraci v. 
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The language of the alternative proof standard articulated in 
§ 703(m) of Title VII,59 generally thought to apply to “mixed motive” 
cases,60 likewise does not seem to preclude liability for unconscious 
discrimination. Under § 703(m), liability is established upon proof that 
an impermissible classification was “a motivating factor for any 
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the 
practice.”61 This language by itself does not preclude liability for 
unconscious discrimination, so long as the “motivation” of an action is 
understood to include unconscious as well as conscious influences that 
bear on an employer’s decisionmaking.62 If we understand motivation 
broadly to refer to an action’s actual psychological impetus, it does not 
seem implausible to think of unconscious bias as something that can 
“motivate” action.63 Thus, when an employer’s action is affected by 
unconscious bias with respect to a prohibited consideration, it is 
semantically plausible to claim the illegitimate consideration is “a 
motivating factor” which would be sufficient to establish liability under 
§ 703(m). 
In the “Work Experience” case, it is stipulated that the race of the 
two managerial candidates explains the employer’s action, even though 
 
Moody-Tottrup, Int’l, Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996); Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 
932–33 (7th Cir. 1995). The reason for rejecting liability in such cases, however, is that the employee’s 
protected characteristic cannot possibly make a difference to an employer’s decision and, therefore, 
cannot help explain it if that characteristic is not even known to the employer. The requirement of 
awareness of the protected characteristic does not speak to whether the employer must be consciously 
motivated by that awareness. 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 60. There is presently considerable uncertainty about the circumstances in which the “motivating 
factor” standard of § 703(m) governs the sufficiency of a Title VII plaintiff’s proof of discrimination. 
The Supreme Court in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa rejected the imposition of a heightened evidentiary 
requirement as a precondition to the application of § 703(m). 539 U.S. 90, 101–02 (2003). At the same 
time, the Court assumed without deciding that § 703(m) is properly applied only to a certain subset of 
disparate treatment cases (“mixed motive” cases), while other cases would presumably be governed by 
the proof framework originally laid out in McDonnell Douglas. See id. at 94 n.1. The Desert Palace 
Court declined, however, to provide positive guidance as to how the subset of cases governed by 
§ 703(m) should be delineated. The Court’s silence has given rise to a divergence of approaches among 
the circuit courts. Compare Ginger v. District of Columbia, 527 F.3d 1340, 1345–46 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(refusing to apply § 703(m) where plaintiff failed to argue a mixed motives theory of liability), with 
Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1037–42 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying the 
“motivating factor” standard of § 703(m) to a case in which the plaintiff had relied on McDonnell 
Douglas to establish her prima facie case). See generally Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences 
Proving Discrimination, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1243 (2008) [hereinafter Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences] 
(analyzing the relationship between McDonnell Douglas and the § 703(m) standard of proof); Michael 
J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 
53 Emory L.J. 1887 (2004) [hereinafter Zimmer, The New Discrimination] (discussing the logical 
implications of Desert Palace for structures of proof in disparate treatment litigation). 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 62. See Faigman et al., supra note 20, at 1397 (noting Congress’s silence on whether implicit bias 
can constitute “a motivating factor”). 
 63. See id. at 1395–97. 
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the employer did not consciously consider that factor. On this 
assumption, it seems perfectly plausible to say that the employer chose 
the white individual over the black one “because of such individual’s 
race,”64 and also that the candidates’ race was “a motivating factor for”65 
the employer’s decision. The literal language of Title VII does not 
foreclose holding the employer liable, even though she never acted on 
any conscious consideration of race. 
C. Summary 
I have suggested that under existing case law, it would be difficult to 
argue for employer liability on the facts of the “Work Experience” case, 
even though a literal reading of the relevant text of Title VII does not 
foreclose such an argument. Perhaps the more relevant observation, 
though, is that courts have not had occasion to consider squarely the 
precise issue that the hypothetical case presents. In the non-hypothetical 
world, practical issues of proof and scientific validity make the question 
of liability based on unconscious bias alone unripe for litigation and 
judicial consideration.66 Thus, even if some case law could be understood 
as allowing for the possibility of employer liability in our “Work 
Experience” hypothetical, there is no authority that would unequivocally 
support that result. In what follows, I turn my attention to the question 
of whether the law ought to allow for such liability. Should our 
employment discrimination laws permit the imposition of employer 
liability based on proof of unconscious discrimination? What reasons are 
there in favor of such liability? And what reasons might there be for the 
law to remain inhospitable to such claims? 
IV.  The Normative Question 
In this Part, I summarize various familiar arguments in favor of and 
against adapting Title VII to account for unconscious discrimination. I 
then explore why those “surface” arguments fail to provide a satisfactory 
answer to the deeper normative question whether unconsciously biased 
action should be regarded as legally actionable discrimination. 
A. Surface Arguments 
The arguments in favor of interpreting or reforming Title VII to 
account for unconscious discrimination are familiar.67 These arguments 
 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 65. Id. § 2000e-2(m). 
 66. See Selmi, supra note 23, at 1243 (“[T]here is a veritable absence of litigation over the 
unconscious nature of discrimination, an issue that is rarely raised in reported cases.”). 
 67. For a concise survey of some of the reforms that have been proposed by scholars, see Bartlett, 
supra note 1, at 1926–30. 
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generally share the premise that unconscious bias not only is real in the 
sense described above, but that it is pervasive.68 If that is so, then we 
should expect it to be a significant source of workplace inequality and 
unequal treatment, a source of inequality no less important than 
intentional discrimination or the sort of practices that produce outcomes 
cognizable as disparate impact. The basic argument, given this 
expectation, is simple. If unconscious bias really does pervade 
decisionmaking in the workplace, then it will be impossible to achieve 
the most basic goals of employment discrimination law—to create 
genuine equality of opportunity and to eliminate patterns of substantive 
inequality that track protected categories69—unless we adapt the law to 
be able to respond to such bias.70 
Whether or not the employment discrimination laws can effectively 
reduce the prevalence of bias,71 one thing they can do is to make local 
corrections for resultant inequalities by allowing for the imposition of 
liability where it can be proved that a forbidden bias—conscious or 
unconscious—explains the adverse decision at issue. For example, by 
invalidating the employer’s decision in the “Work Experience” case, the 
law could correct an economic distribution (the allocation of the job to 
the white candidate) that is traceable to an adverse racial attitude. This is 
precisely the sort of distributive inequality that the employment 
discrimination statutes are meant to address.72 A commitment to 
achieving this basic goal of employment discrimination law73 thus creates 
a reason in favor of extending its reach to include employment actions 
influenced by unconscious bias.74 
 
 68. See generally Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 1; Kang & Banaji, supra note 2, at 1072 
(analyzing implicit bias and its pervasiveness). 
 69. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–01 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971). 
 70. See Krieger, supra note 2, at 1241; see also Eva Paterson et al., The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection in the 21st Century: Building Upon Charles Lawrence’s Vision to Mount a Contemporary 
Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1175, 1195 (2008). 
 71. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination Law’s Effects on Implicit Bias, in 3 NYU Selected 
Essays on Labor and Employment Law: Behavioral Analyses of Workplace Discrimination, 
supra note 21, at 69, 73. 
 72. Cf. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990–91 (1988) (arguing that 
“subconscious stereotypes and prejudices” that infect “undisciplined” subjective decision making are a 
“lingering form of the problem that Title VII was enacted to combat” and should be subject to Title 
VII liability, insofar as such decisionmaking “has precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by 
impermissible intentional discrimination”). 
 73. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (noting that a central purpose of 
Title VII is “making persons whole for injuries” resulting from discrimination). 
 74. The argument for liability need not exclude the possibility that an employer could voluntarily 
undertake measures to reduce the effects of bias. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green & Alexandra Kalev, 
Discrimination-Reducing Measures at the Relational Level, 59 Hastings L.J. 1435, 1438–54 (2008) 
(discussing steps to reduce unconscious discrimination that may reduce or insulate underlying levels of 
implicit bias). 
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On the other side, there are a variety of arguments against liability 
for unconscious discrimination. Some of them seem predicated primarily 
on skepticism about the actuality of unconscious discrimination75 or on 
the practical and epistemological difficulties of establishing that a 
particular action was in fact influenced by unconscious bias.76  
Other arguments against liability for unconscious discrimination 
raise empirical concerns about efficacy. For example, one might contend 
that holding employers liable for unconscious discrimination will not 
significantly improve workplace equality stemming from implicit bias 
because even if such liability might provide corrective action in a tiny 
number of litigated cases, it would not effectively reduce the actual 
incidences of implicit bias in the employment context.77 In addition, 
liability for unconscious discrimination could actually have adverse 
consequences for minorities in the workplace. Such liability might 
increase the predicted costs of hiring employees who are members of a 
statutorily protected group.78 Further, perceptions that such liability 
would be unfairly punitive could create a counterproductive backlash of 
resistance and negative attitudes toward the law, which could impede the 
internalization of antidiscrimination norms by workplace actors.79 
B. The Deeper Problem 
All of the foregoing arguments, though, miss a deeper point of 
contention, a potential source of reluctance to embrace the possibility of 
liability for unconscious discrimination that does not simply boil down to 
skepticism about the efficacy of such a regime in achieving desired goals 
and does not depend on disproving that such liability would in fact 
reduce workplace inequality. In other words, I think that liability for 
unconscious discrimination would remain controversial even if there 
were conclusive evidence that it would in fact reduce workplace 
inequality overall. The question I want to explore is: why? 
From a skeptical perspective, all of the arguments in favor of 
liability for unconscious discrimination are question-begging in a crucial 
way. They presuppose that something objectionable happens whenever 
an employer action was causally influenced by a protected characteristic 
of the adversely affected individual, regardless of whether the employer 
genuinely believed she had adequate reasons for the action. In other 
 
 75. For references to some of the critical literature, see Bartlett, supra note 1, at 1896 n.4. 
 76. See Wax, supra note 6, at 981–86. These worries are largely mooted by my working 
assumption that unconscious discrimination is real. 
 77. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 986–87. 
 78. Cf. Christine Jolls, Commentary, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 
642, 686–87 (2001) (arguing that antidiscrimination laws impose greater costs to employers because 
they must employ certain employees against customer and coworker attitudes). 
 79. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 1936–41. 
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words, the arguments assume that if a protected characteristic is part of 
the causal predicate that explains what happened, then a corrective 
response is in order. This is surely a plausible position, but it assumes an 
answer to the hard question at hand. The hard question is precisely 
whether, as a matter of discrimination law, we should believe something 
objectionable occurred when, though an employer genuinely sought to 
act on permissible—even justifiable—reasons, the employer’s actions 
were influenced by an employee’s protected characteristic. 
Consider again the “Work Experience” hypothetical. Suppose that 
we were completely convinced that, from a systemic perspective, a 
regime of liability for unconscious discrimination was necessary to 
achieve meaningful reductions of race-based inequality in employment. 
Would we then have to conclude, as a matter of logic, that the 
employer’s decision in the “Work Experience” case should be treated as 
actionable discrimination? I do not believe so, and the reason is that 
policy arguments of the sort canvassed above do not reach the deepest 
point of controversy. That question is whether we should regard the 
employer’s action as legally invalid simply because it was precipitated by 
implicit bias, even though the reasons on which the employer consciously 
sought to act were in fact legally adequate to justify the decision that she 
made. Claiming that the decision should be legally invalid because it had 
a race-related cause simply begs the critical question of what, 
fundamentally, the legal charge of discrimination entails. Should the 
objection entail only that the action in question was causally influenced 
by a protected characteristic? Or should it entail that the action’s 
justification was invalid or defective in virtue of incorporating an 
illegitimate consideration? Should the legal charge of discrimination be 
understood fundamentally as a demand for justification of action, or as a 
call for a causal inquiry into an historical event? 
V.  Causal and Justificatory Conceptions of Discrimination 
The question, in short, is whether employment discrimination law 
should embrace a conception of discrimination that hinges on 
examination of the causal history of an employment event or, in contrast, 
on the putative justificatory rationale of the employer’s action. The first 
view—call it a “causal” conception of discrimination—would incline 
toward a finding of liability in the “Work Experience” case because it is 
clear that the rejected candidate’s race, a protected characteristic, is 
necessary to a complete explanation of what actually brought about the 
observed result.80 The other view—call it a “justificatory” conception—
 
 80. See Krieger, supra note 2, at 1242 (“The critical inquiry would be whether the applicant or 
employee’s group status ‘made a difference’ in the employer’s action, not whether the decisionmaker 
intended that it make a difference.”). 
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would probably find no actionable discrimination in the “Work 
Experience” hypothetical, because no forbidden consideration played 
any role in the justificatory rationale that informed the employer’s own 
understanding of her decision about which candidate to hire. 
Doubts about liability for unconscious discrimination on the facts of 
the “Work Experience” case, even with all of the accompanying 
stipulations, come from the perspective of a justificatory conception of 
discrimination. I argue in this Part that the justificatory conception is 
engrained in our current law, and that the causal conception would 
represent a radical shift in our understanding of what discrimination is, 
not just an incremental expansion of the scope of the employment 
discrimination laws. 
What I am calling the deep distinction between the causal and 
justificatory conceptions of discrimination does not simply reduce to a 
question about whether discrimination should be restricted to intentional 
acts of differential treatment on the basis of a forbidden consideration, or 
whether the law should also impose liability for unintentional acts of 
differential treatment. The unease we may feel about liability for 
unconscious discrimination is not explained by some general objection to 
liability in the absence of intent to discriminate. After all, the law already 
provides a cause of action—the disparate impact claim—that allows the 
imposition of liability for discrimination even in the absence of any 
intention to treat individuals differently on account of a protected 
characteristic. Because our employment discrimination law already 
countenances liability in the absence of discriminatory intent, the deep 
objection to liability for unconscious discrimination cannot be based on a 
normative difficulty relating to that consideration. The problem with 
liability for unconscious discrimination must be something else. 
If the law already accepts the possibility of liability in the absence of 
discriminatory intent, why should it have a problem with liability for 
unconscious discrimination? My claim is that the difficulty with liability 
for unconscious discrimination is that such liability depends on a causal 
conception of discrimination that displaces the significance of a 
justificatory one. Returning to the facts of the “Work Experience” case 
may help to illustrate the difference. We have been focusing on the 
stipulated fact that the employer’s decision to hire the white job 
candidate was precipitated by an unconscious psychological disposition 
to disfavor blacks (or to favor whites). But there is another important 
assumed fact: namely, that the employer’s subjective motivation in 
acting—her belief that the white applicant was the better candidate 
because of her work experience—is nondiscriminatory and, what is more, 
seems to reflect an objectively adequate reason for selecting that 
candidate. Superiority of work experience is a legitimate consideration 
that can provide sufficient reason for preferring one job candidate over 
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another—in other words, a permissible reason for the sort of decision in 
question. 
We can gain an important insight by asking what principle is implied 
by the claim that the employer’s selection of the white applicant in the 
“Work Experience” case should be regarded as actionable 
discrimination. I argue that it implies that the objective justifiability of an 
action from the perspective of the actor’s genuine understanding of the 
relevant considerations matters less than an agent-neutral inquiry into 
the factors that had a causal influence on the ultimate outcome. The 
causal inquiry trumps and displaces the justificatory one for purposes of 
determining whether an action constitutes discrimination. In other 
words, if our hypothetical employer is liable, that means the objective 
adequacy of her own genuine reasons-based explanation of her action 
must yield to the causal psychological history that culminated in that act. 
The legal status of the act depends on its psychological etiology, not on 
the actor’s ability to satisfy a demand for justification. 
This causal conception of actionable discrimination allows for the 
imposition of liability even when the employer acted on considerations 
that provide legitimate, adequate reasons for the adverse differential 
treatment in question. I contend that this conception implicates a 
fundamental change in the meaning of discrimination. It changes the 
charge of discrimination from an action-guiding demand of equal respect 
to a factual assertion about the psychology of the actor and transforms 
the relevant inquiry from the quasi-moral business of calling upon the 
employer to justify her action to the quasi-scientific business of 
identifying the psychological causal antecedents of that action. In a 
regime of liability for unconscious discrimination, the statutory 
proscription against discrimination shifts from an action-guiding 
principle that constrains the considerations that can justify differential 
adverse treatment to a kind of mandatory tax on unconscious 
contributions to the problem of workplace inequality. 
A. Why the Law Resists Liability for Unconscious Discrimination 
Is the shift to a causal conception of discrimination really a radical 
change from the law’s current understanding? I believe it is. Consider 
again the currently prevailing models of actionable discrimination. In a 
disparate treatment action, an employer can respond to the charge of 
discrimination by articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse 
action at issue. Unless the aggrieved employee can prove that this 
articulated reason was pretextual, the employer’s stated justification for 
the adverse action will defeat the charge.81 Thus, the charge of 
discrimination implies that either there were no nondiscriminatory 
 
 81. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509–11 (1993). 
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reasons supporting the employer’s adverse action,82 or that the employer 
acted on considerations that are statutorily proscribed. Conversely, if 
there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action, and if 
that reason genuinely constituted the employer’s rationale for that 
action, then there is no actionable discrimination on a disparate 
treatment theory.83 The focus of the inquiry is on whether the employer’s 
reasons—the employer’s rationale for acting—passes muster under a 
principle of nondiscrimination.84 The statutory proscription serves as an 
action-guiding constraint on the considerations that can count as valid 
reasons for differential adverse treatment. 
1. Current Predominance of the Justificatory Conception 
Contemporary theories of disparate treatment based on social 
stereotyping also fit within the justificatory conception of discrimination, 
even though they might at first blush seem to incorporate causal 
elements. In a stereotyping case, the plaintiff seeks to establish the intent 
element of the disparate treatment claim by an allegation that the 
employer acted on an illegitimate generalization about members of a 
protected class.85 Treating a person differently because of such a 
stereotype is clearly a form of actionable discrimination.86 Insofar as 
prejudicial stereotypes that affect our judgments about others may be 
largely inchoate and even subconscious, it might seem that liability based 
on stereotypes is akin to liability based on unconscious discrimination87 
—therefore, disproving my claim that the causal conception of 
discrimination is foreign to our current understanding. Liability based on 
prejudicial stereotypes, however—whether conscious or unconscious88—
cannot be reduced to a purely causal inquiry into whether a 
psychological attitude influenced the actor’s cognition. A stereotype is 
 
 82. In which case, the employer could not meet its burden of production in the standard 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
248, 255 (1981). 
 83. In a mixed-motives case, the plaintiff only need prove that one of the statutorily forbidden 
considerations was “a motivating factor” in the employer’s action, and the employer can be held liable 
even if other considerations also motivated that action. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). This is typically understood to require some proof that the employer 
took a statutorily forbidden consideration into account, even though it also relied on other factors in 
taking the adverse action at issue. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–99 (2003). Thus, 
even in a mixed-motives case, there is no actionable discrimination unless a discriminatory reason 
constitutes at least part of the employer’s own true understanding of the basis for its action. 
 84. See, e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254–56. 
 85. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241–42 (1989). 
 86. See id. at 239. 
 87. See Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences, supra note 60, at 1279 (“[E]vidence of stereotypical 
thinking supports an ultimate inference of intent to discriminate precisely because it is an unconscious 
expression of bias.”). 
 88. See Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 138 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir. 1999). 
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arguably a form of propositional belief, a schematic construct89 that 
provides putative reasons for action or judgment.90 To act on a stereotype 
is to act, consciously or unconsciously, on the basis of a belief about 
members of a particular class—e.g., “all X’s have property F” or “all 
good Y’s exhibit behavior G.” The legal invalidation of actions based on 
such stereotypes entails a judgment that beliefs of that sort are not to be 
regarded as legitimate reasons for taking an adverse employment action. 
Holding an employer liable for acting on a prejudicial stereotype 
constitutes a rejection of a putative rationale—namely, the stereotyping 
belief—for the action, a refutation of the action’s true justification. The 
same cannot be said for holding the employer liable for the sort of 
unconscious discrimination illustrated in the “Work Experience” case, 
because the employer’s action, by hypothesis, does not entail any sort of 
racial stereotyping beliefs, conscious or otherwise. There, the predicate 
for liability is the causal influence of a racial attitude (a negative 
disposition toward blacks) in the employer’s formation of her rationale 
for action—in other words, that work experience is more important than 
interview performance, not the objectionable nature of the rationale 
itself as a principle of action. 
Finally, even the disparate impact cause of action evinces a 
justificatory conception of actionable discrimination, not a causal one. 
While it is of course true that disparate impact liability does not require 
proof of intent to discriminate,91 the disparate impact cause of action 
must still ultimately be conceived as an evaluation of the employer’s 
rationale in carrying out whatever practices created the observed 
disparities in question. This is so because the employer can avoid liability 
by proving that the particular employment practice that created the 
observed disparate outcomes was “job related . . . and consistent with 
business necessity.”92 In other words, although the employer rather than 
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving business necessity, the 
important point is that the employer can avoid liability, even in a 
disparate impact case, by showing that the challenged employment 
practice was justified by adequate reasons.93 Although the plaintiff can 
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact by showing that the 
employer’s practices caused a certain pattern of inequality,94 liability 
 
 89. See Krieger, supra note 2, at 1195 (“Stereotypes are correlational constructs.”). 
 90. See Patrick S. Shin, Vive la Différence? A Critical Analysis of the Justification of Sex-
Dependent Workplace Restrictions on Dress and Grooming, 14 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 491, 499–
501 (2007) (discussing different types of behavior leading to stereotypes).  
 91. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009). 
 92. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
 93. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678–81 (explaining that liability for disparate impact ultimately 
depends on the employer’s inability to prove that its practices were justified by business necessity, or a 
less discriminatory alternative to those practices was available). 
 94. See id. at 2677–78. 
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depends upon a justificatory inquiry into whether the employer’s 
practices were necessary: Were those practices justified by good business 
reasons, and were they justified even in light of other available 
alternatives?95 If the practices were justified, then the employer prevails, 
even though the employer’s practices might continue to cause racially 
disparate consequences.96 Disparate impact liability therefore depends 
ultimately on a test of the adequacy of the employer’s putative rationale. 
In this context, no less than in the case of disparate treatment, the 
prohibition of discrimination can be seen as an action-guiding demand 
for justification, a requirement that employment practices that adversely 
affect members of protected groups be backed by a legally sufficient 
reason. 
2. Liability for Unconscious Discrimination and the Causal 
Conception 
Consider, in contrast, the conception of actionable discrimination 
implied by the possibility of liability in the “Work Experience” 
hypothetical. In that case, there seems to be an acceptable justification 
for the decision to hire the white applicant (a preference for work 
experience), and this justification constitutes the employer’s ostensive 
rationale, her genuine understanding of the basis of her action. We 
cannot say that the employer lacked adequate justification for hiring the 
white applicant, nor can we say that the decision was unjustified under 
the employer’s rationale. A view under which this employer’s decision is 
regarded as actionably discriminatory effectively rejects the idea that we 
should give controlling significance to the question of the adequacy of 
the action’s rationale. What is controlling is that the employer’s 
reasoning, whether or not it was sufficient to justify the action, was in fact 
influenced by her awareness of the race of the two applicants.97 
Moreover, if the employer is liable because of the operation of 
unconscious bias, then, in an important way, the proscription against 
discrimination ceases to be an action-guiding constraint on employment 
action.98 In the “Work Experience” case, by hypothesis, the employer did 
not treat any illicit consideration as a reason in favor of her decision, and 
the bias that influenced her act does not represent any attitude or 
 
 95. See id. at 2678–81. 
 96. See id. 
 97. Recall that we are assuming that the employer would have reasoned to the opposite 
conclusion but for the rejected applicant’s being black. 
 98. As Linda Krieger has described the argument, “the normative utility of a rule prohibiting 
discrimination depends entirely on decisionmaker self-awareness. . . . Absent decisionmaker self-
awareness, the nondiscrimination principle—if framed solely as a prohibitory injunction ‘not to 
discriminate’—loses its normative mooring.” Krieger, supra note 2, at 1186. Professor Krieger argues, 
of course, that discrimination should not be defined in terms of a violation of that sort of prohibitory 
injunction. See id. at 1239–40. 
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judgment that the employer himself would endorse. If liability is imposed 
in cases like the “Work Experience” hypothetical, then the statutory 
proscription becomes more akin to what might be regarded as a tax, a 
mandatory cost levied against the operation of the employer’s 
unconscious bias, regardless of the employer’s ability to justify her action 
under nondiscriminatory principles. 
The conceptual shift implicated by liability for unconscious 
discrimination, then, is a shift from a prescriptive, action-guiding regime 
that constrains the considerations that can provide legitimate reasons for 
adverse action to a primarily diagnostic regime that focuses on ferreting 
out potential psychological causes of persisting workplace inequality. 
The prohibition against discrimination changes from a demand that 
employers be prepared to justify their actions on grounds that do not 
involve a protected characteristic to a statement putting employers on 
notice that actions that adversely affect members of protected groups will 
give rise to liability upon proof that the actions were causally influenced 
by such a characteristic. This is a move from a quasi-moral, justification-
based conception of discrimination to a quasi-scientific, psychological-
causal conception. 
It is true that, in a way, our current conception of discrimination is 
already partly psychological and depends, as legal responsibility does 
more generally, on proof of causation. Disparate treatment liability 
depends, for example, on an examination of what a decisionmaker 
actually considered and believed, and that sort of inquiry is in some sense 
a matter of identifying the considerations that were causally relevant in 
the actor’s actual psychology.99 So, I am certainly not denying that 
causation is relevant to the law’s current conception of discrimination, 
nor am I trying to make any sort of broad claim about the notions of 
causation that figure into legal doctrines governing responsibility more 
generally.100 My claim is that the argument in favor of liability for 
unconscious discrimination departs radically from our current conception 
of discrimination, because it requires cleaving the causation inquiry 
entirely from any evaluation of the adequacy of the agent’s subjective 
rationale for the action in dispute.101 
 
 99. See Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences, supra note 60, at 1244 (discussing the requirement that 
the plaintiff prove a “link” between the defendant’s discriminatory motive and the adverse 
employment action at issue). 
 100. For a careful and exhaustive inquiry into the concepts of causation that are implicit and 
explicit in doctrines of responsibility in criminal law and torts, see generally Michael S. Moore, 
Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics (2009). 
 101. Sheila Foster has made the point, albeit in the service of a much different thesis than I am 
propounding here, that “the causal inquiry in antidiscrimination cases [under current law] is 
evaluative, not explanatory.” Sheila R. Foster, Causation in Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent 
Versus Impact, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 1469, 1517 (2005) (emphasis omitted) (cautioning that determinations 
about the causes of a decision or set of consequences may themselves be subject to the influence of 
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It is also true that the current legal framework governing disparate 
treatment claims requires a causal inquiry relating to the actor’s 
psychology in the limited sense that liability depends upon figuring out 
what beliefs, perceptions, and judgments actually constituted the 
rationale on which the employer relied in acting as she did.102 But on the 
model of discrimination that would impose liability for unconscious bias, 
the inquiry bypasses the actor’s putative rationale and seeks an 
explanation of the act in terms of any aspect of the actor’s psychology—
not just the beliefs and attitudes that the actor himself would endorse—
that could be regarded as a causal influence. What is radical here is the 
implicit premise that whenever an unconscious bias can be identified as a 
causal influence, liability is justified, even if the actor’s own rationale for 
acting provides adequate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the action in 
question. On the causal conception, when inquiries into the actor’s 
genuine rationale and the scientifically determinable psychological 
causes of her action yield different answers to the question whether a 
protected characteristic made a difference to the actor’s decision, then it 
is the scientific psychological cause, not our putative reason-giving, that 
controls whether the action should be regarded as objectionable 
discrimination. 
3. Precepts of Responsibility 
What explains the felt reluctance to embrace liability for 
unconscious discrimination is, I think, the philosophical tension between 
(a) conceiving of an action as a product of scientifically determinable, 
subterranean psychological causes; and (b) conceiving of that action as 
the sort of thing for which an agent should be held responsible in any 
robust sense.103 In the context of practical debates about whether to hold 
a person responsible for an act, to explain a given act as the determined 
consequence of antecedent historical causes normally has the force of 
preempting claims of moral responsibility for the act.104 This tendency 
should be familiar from basic philosophical debates about criminal 
 
implicit biases and stereotyping beliefs). 
 102. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255–56 (1981). 
 103. This general tension is one of the central themes of the philosophy of action or action theory. 
Seminal contemporary works that identify many of the questions that have occupied theorists in this 
field include G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention (Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 2000), Donald Davidson, 
Essays on Actions and Events (1980), and Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in Free Will 
59–80 (Gary Watson ed., 1982). For an accessible discussion of how some of these questions apply in 
the context of criminal law, see R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency & Criminal Liability: Philosophy of 
Action and the Criminal Law (1990). 
 104. Note that I am making a claim about the force of deterministic causal explanations in the 
context of practical deliberation about whether to hold a person responsible for an act. I am not 
suggesting, and in fact would deny, that causal explanations in general are incompatible with 
attributions of responsibility. For philosophical perspectives that inform my own views on this latter 
question, see T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other 248–94 (1998); R. Jay Wallace, 
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments 51–83 (1994). 
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responsibility.105 We might be reminded of Chief Justice Weintraub’s 
concurring opinion in State v. Sikora.106 The issue for the court there had 
to do with the legal relevance of expert psychiatric testimony opining 
that a criminal defendant’s act of murder was “motivated by the 
predetermined influence of his unconscious”107 and therefore lacked the 
level of intentionality required for a conviction of first degree murder.108 
More interesting for present purposes than the court’s holding on this 
question109 is the philosophical question taken up by Chief Justice 
Weintraub in his concurrence. His concurrence is notable because of how 
strikingly, yet to opposite effect, his discussion relates to the question of 
liability for unconscious discrimination: 
  The psychiatric view [of the defendant’s criminal act] seems quite 
scientific. It rests upon the elementary concept of cause and effect. The 
individual is deemed the product of many causes. As a matter of 
historical fact, he was not the author of any of the formative forces, nor 
of his capacity or lack of capacity to deal with them. . . .  
  . . . .  
  . . . [The psychiatrist] traces a man’s every deed to some cause truly 
beyond the actor’s own making, and says that although the man was 
aware of his action, he was unaware of assembled forces in his 
unconscious which decided his course. Thus the conscious is a puppet, 
and the unconscious the puppeteer.110 
Characterizing the psychiatrist’s view as likening the criminal defendant 
to an “automaton whose unconscious directs . . . antisocial deeds,”111 
Justice Weintraub argues that this view is “simply irreconcilable” with 
the very possibility of criminal responsibility: 
To grant a role in our existing [legal] structure to the theme that the 
conscious is just the innocent puppet of a nonculpable unconscious is to 
make a mishmash of the criminal law, permitting—indeed requiring—
each trier of the facts to choose between the automaton thesis and the 
law’s existing concept of criminal accountability. It would be absurd to 
decide criminal blameworthiness upon a psychiatric thesis which can 
find no basis for personal blame. So long as we adhere to criminal 
blameworthiness, mens rea must be sought and decided at the level of 
conscious behavior.112 
Justice Weintraub sees the causal model of action (the picture of the 
conscious actor as the puppet of unconscious motives) as antithetical to 
 
 105. See generally Duff, supra note 103, at 101–02. 
 106. 210 A.2d 193, 204–07 (N.J. 1965). 
 107. Id. at 201 (majority opinion). 
 108. See id. at 202. 
 109. The court concluded that the psychiatric testimony at issue was inadmissible on the question 
of guilt but admissible for purposes of determining punishment. See id. at 204. 
 110. Id. at 205 (Weintraub, C.J., concurring). 
 111. Id. at 206. 
 112. Id. at 207. 
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the notion of criminal responsibility, and he argues that our practices of 
placing criminal blame imply a rejection of that model. From this 
perspective, the argument for liability based on implicit bias seems to go 
directly against the grain of conventional arguments about the necessary 
conditions of holding someone responsible for an action.113 Normally, to 
view an act as caused by factors outside the actor’s control and 
awareness, and which are severed from the actor’s conscious attitudes 
and beliefs, runs counter to holding the actor responsible.114 The 
argument for liability in the “Work Experience” case is a direct rejection 
of that familiar philosophical dynamic. It is, in fact, an argument in favor 
of liability that depends on thinking of the employer’s action in 
predominantly causal terms. The argument, counterintuitively, is that the 
employer should be held liable because she acts as a puppet controlled by 
her unconscious motivations. No wonder the idea of liability for 
unconscious discrimination seems so deeply controversial, even with all 
of the assumptions we have been indulging. 
C. Implications of a Commitment to the Causal Conception 
To say that the idea is controversial, of course, is not to say that it is 
wrong. My observations about the conceptual implications of liability for 
unconscious discrimination do not, in themselves, recommend for or 
against such liability. Perhaps we should want to shift our understanding 
of discrimination to accommodate a more scientific approach; perhaps 
we are misguided to conceive of human action as anything other than the 
result of causes that lie beyond our will.115 At least as a purely textual 
matter, as I argued above,116 Title VII’s vague “because of” language 
seems to invite a causal interpretation of discrimination in a way that the 
fundamental principles governing criminal liability manifestly do not.117 
Yet, I do think there are important theoretical problems with a causal 
conception of discrimination that go beyond its merely being 
counterintuitive. I have explained that our felt reservation about liability 
for unconscious discrimination might be rooted in its connection with a 
causal conception of action. In the remainder of this Article, I offer some 
 
 113. I am making a claim here about precepts of choice and responsibility that inform our actual 
practices of holding persons responsible. Cf. Scanlon, supra note 104, at 277–80. 
 114. See id. Again, to be clear, I deny (for reasons elaborated by Scanlon) that responsibility 
presupposes control over the causes of our actions in any sense that would be incompatible with 
philosophical determinism. See id. For another concise argument that there is no relevant sense of 
“control” that governs attributions of responsibility, see Moore, supra note 100, at 24–26. 
 115. For an example of this view based on psychological science, see Daniel M. Wegner, The 
Illusion of Conscious Will (2002); cf. Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World, 
2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 601, 672–73. 
 116. See supra text accompanying notes 48–65. 
 117. My claim is about what the statutory text seems to permit, not about how courts have actually 
understood it.  
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possible concerns about incorporating such a conception into our legal 
understanding of discrimination. 
1. The Charge of Discrimination as Diagnosis 
The first worry is that the scientific, causal conception of 
discrimination diminishes the seriousness of the objection of 
discrimination as a moral criticism of an individual’s or employer’s 
action.118 On the traditional, reasons-based conception, to object to an 
action as discrimination is to make a claim that the employer’s rationale 
for the action was inadequate as a justification. The proscription of 
discrimination, so understood, has clear action-guiding, prescriptive 
force. From the perspective of the deliberating agent, it places a 
constraint on what the agent can adopt or endorse as a rationale for 
acting, a demand that the agent avoid acting on the basis of certain 
specified considerations. We are warranted in criticizing an agent who 
violates that demand, because everyone is morally answerable for acting 
on the basis of justifications that are institutionally illegitimate or that we 
could not reasonably expect others to accept. 
The unconscious bias conception of discrimination shifts our focus 
from the deliberative perspective—the view of ourselves as agents who 
have the ability to choose the reasons on which we act—to a perspective 
in which our actions are the result of unconscious psychological forces 
that may be wholly unresponsive to any demand for reasons.119 To what 
then, does the charge of discrimination on this view amount? Arguably, 
it ceases to have moral significance at all, at least as a criticism of the 
actor. In a scenario like that in the “Work Experience” case, where the 
actor can genuinely disavow any prejudicial motive, and where the 
actor’s unconscious bias does not reflect her conscious attitudes, beliefs, 
and judgments, a charge of discrimination based on the fact of that bias is 
hardly a criticism at all of the actor-as-moral-agent.120 The objection of 
discrimination takes on a diagnostic character rather than a moral one. It 
becomes primarily a claim that the action in question can be explained by 
 
 118. This concern is perhaps what underlies the argument advanced by certain critics that some 
constructions of implicit bias are too overinclusive to have real legal or political significance. See Arkes 
& Tetlock, supra note 8, at 264, 275. In the title of their critical article, Arkes and Tetlock ask the 
question, “Would Jesse Jackson ‘Fail’ the Implicit Association Test?” See id. at 257. The authors 
suggest that the answer is yes, which they take as a reason to be skeptical about the concept of implicit 
bias. See id. at 264, 270. Put more generally, the argument is that any test of discriminatory bias that 
could not be “passed” by someone like Jesse Jackson, an outspoken advocate for antidiscrimination 
and equality, could not be capturing any worthwhile conception of discrimination. For a response to 
this sort of argument, see Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 488–90. 
 119. See Denno, supra note 115, at 672–73. 
 120. For philosophical elaborations on this sort of view of the conditions under which it is 
appropriate to blame an agent for wrongdoing, see Pamela Hieronymi, The Force and Fairness of 
Blame, 18 Phil. Persp. 115 (2004); see also T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, 
Meaning, Blame 197–98 (2008); Scanlon, supra note 104, at 277–80; Angela M. Smith, Control, 
Responsibility, and Moral Assessment, 138 Phil. Stud. 367 (2008). 
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reference to a certain psychological cause that intruded on the actor’s 
active agency, not a criticism of the actor’s exercise of that agency. The 
agent might embody or be a carrier of an inequality-producing bias. 
However, if that bias truly is not responsive to the agent’s own 
judgments, then criticizing the agent for being influenced by that bias 
would be akin to criticizing an individual for infecting someone with a 
virus that the individual had no idea she was carrying.121 Such criticism 
might be warranted to the extent that the individual had reason to take 
precautions against passing on the virus,122 but absent such reason, the 
criticism would be misplaced.123 The point is that if the charge of 
discrimination on the causal conception can, at least in some instances, 
entail nothing more than just such a diagnostic, explanatory claim, then 
that conception arguably weakens the moral significance of the charge of 
discrimination.124 
2. The Problem of Conceptual Instability: “Work Experience II” 
The second worry is that the causal-psychological conception of 
discrimination creates an instability in the law of employment 
discrimination. The instability can be introduced with a simple question: 
If we agree that an employer can be subject to liability on the basis of a 
cause, such as implicit bias, that lies outside the awareness and judgment-
sensitive attitudes125 of the decisionmaker, why should liability be limited 
to cases where that cause resides in the actor’s psychology? What is so 
special about psychological causes of discrimination that lie in the actor? 
Return for a last time to the hypothetical employer in the “Work 
Experience” case. Let us change the facts a bit—call this variation of the 
case “Work Experience II.” Suppose, now, that the employer does not 
suffer from any implicit racial biases. Imagine again that our hypothetical 
 
 121. Cf. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 321 (1987) (analogizing racism to a “disease” or 
“illness . . . that infects almost everyone”). 
 122. This would be analogous to the unconsciously biased actor having reason to take precautions 
against the influence of her unknown biases. 
 123. For a rather different philosophical perspective, see George Sher, Who Knew?: 
Responsibility Without Awareness (2009). On Sher’s account, an agent can be morally responsible 
for an attitude that is causally connected to the agent’s “constitutive features,” see id. at 121–22, which 
need not be aspects of the agent with which he would necessarily identify. See id. at 122 (suggesting 
that even “neurophysiological mechanisms” might count as constitutive). Sher does not discuss the 
problem of unconscious bias in detail, however, and it is not clear to me whether his view implies that 
an agent will usually be morally responsible for her unconscious biases. The answer would depend, I 
suppose, on which aspects of the agent’s psychology could be regarded as constitutive. 
 124. This worry about the causal conception of discrimination is not necessarily an argument 
against negligence-based or strict liability, either in the context of employment discrimination or 
elsewhere. Holding a person liable without requiring proof of intent is not the same thing as holding a 
person liable for an action by virtue of the action’s being influenced by a causal factor outside the 
scope of the actor’s agency. It is the latter sort of liability that is central to the causal conception. 
 125. Scanlon, supra note 104, at 20–24 (coining and explaining the term). 
Shin_62-HLJ-67.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2011 12:06 PM 
98 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:67 
employer selects the white candidate over the black candidate for an 
open managerial position on the basis of the former candidate’s superior 
work experience. But now let us suppose that we know a little bit more 
about the background of our hypothetical black candidate. It turns out 
that the reason that she has less work experience than the white 
candidate is simply that she had great difficulty obtaining employment in 
the early years of her career because of intentional discrimination by 
other potential employers. Absent such discrimination, the black 
candidate’s work experience would have been at least as extensive as the 
white candidate’s. 
Is the employer in the “Work Experience II” hypothetical subject to 
liability for discrimination? I doubt anyone would say so. But if we have 
adopted a causal conception of discrimination that allows liability based 
on the influence of unconscious bias, it becomes strangely difficult to 
justify that answer. It is literally true, after all, that the employer’s 
selection of the white candidate is, indirectly, “because of” the black 
candidate’s race. The factor of race is quite clearly essential to a full 
causal explanation of the employer’s decision. We can presume that if 
the candidate had been white, she would have achieved the same work 
experience as the white candidate and so would not have been rejected—
at least not on the basis of work experience. We might be tempted to 
argue that the employer in the “Work Experience II” case had no control 
over the acts of prior potential employers and so cannot be held liable on 
that basis, but this will not do. The employer in the “Work Experience” 
case had no more control over her implicit and unconscious biases than 
the employer in the “Work Experience II” case had over the prior 
discriminatory causes of the black applicant’s lesser experience. We 
might want to argue that the black candidate’s relative lack of work 
experience is not the fault of the employer and so cannot be the basis for 
liability, but again, this will not do. The employer in the original case also 
was not necessarily at fault in any relevant sense for her implicit biases, 
yet those biases are the anchor of liability on the causal conception of 
discrimination. Finally, we might try to distinguish the cases on the 
grounds that the cause of the black candidate’s rejection in the “Work 
Experience II” hypothetical is prior societal discrimination, rather than 
the employer’s own biases, but that argument simply begs the question of 
why that distinction matters, given the irrelevance of the actor’s 
awareness or responsibility under the causal conception of 
discrimination. 
The point is that if, as is the case with the causal conception, liability 
for discrimination depends solely upon an inquiry into whether the 
aggrieved person’s protected characteristics figures into an adequate 
causal explanation of the adverse employment act, it becomes very 
difficult to say why liability should be limited to those cases in which that 
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causal explanation goes through the psychology of the employer’s 
decisionmaker. To put it another way, the black candidate’s race is (by 
hypothesis) a necessary causal condition of the adverse employment 
action taken against her in both “Work Experience” and “Work 
Experience II”. But if the employer’s action in the original “Work 
Experience” constitutes objectionable discrimination simply in virtue of 
the causal influence of race in the history of that action, then the action 
in “Work Experience II” should also constitute objectionable 
discrimination. On the causal conception of discrimination, there can be 
no principled difference between the rejection of an applicant caused by 
the employer’s unconscious racial bias, and the rejection of an applicant 
based on a job-related deficiency that was caused by past circumstances 
of racial inequality. Limiting liability to those adverse actions that are 
caused by psychological influences linked to the aggrieved party’s 
protected characteristics is an unstable position, or in any event an 
analytically unsatisfying one. 
3. Biting the Bullets 
What are we to make of this instability? One possibility is that it sets 
up a reductio ad absurdum of the causal conception. If the causal 
conception of discrimination results in the absurd conclusion that the 
employer’s action in the “Work Experience II” case constitutes 
objectionable discrimination, then that proves that the causal conception 
of discrimination should be rejected, as should the possibility of liability 
for unconscious discrimination, which depends on that conception. 
There is, however, another important possibility. One could 
conceivably bite the bullet and abandon the notion that the psychology 
of the employer is of the essence in our legal conception of 
discrimination. In other words, one might argue that what I am calling an 
instability—the conflation, invited by the causal conception, of 
differential treatment caused by an employer’s unconscious bias with 
differential treatment caused by an employer’s reliance on facts in turn 
caused by societal racial inequality—actually points the way to a more 
adequate conception of discrimination. According to this “bullet-biting” 
view, we should accept that there truly is no meaningful difference 
between the “Work Experience” and Work Experience II hypotheticals. 
The phenomenon of implicit bias is nothing more than the embodiment 
in individual actors of the circumstances of inequality and patterns of 
racial disadvantage that continue to beset our society and our 
workplaces.126 Implicit bias may operate through our individual 
psychologies, but it is a consequence and reflection of our social 
 
 126. See Lawrence, supra note 121, at 322–23. For a similar argument, see Justin D. Levinson, 
Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 Duke L.J. 345, 417–
20 (2007). 
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history:127 It “reflects the way people unknowingly carry society’s 
weaknesses with them at all times.”128 
This seems to me a deeply plausible view. If we accept it, then the 
argument in favor of liability for unconscious discrimination truly is an 
argument for moving our conception of discrimination away from the 
paradigm of individual human action and more toward a conception that 
defines it as something like the expression of our persistent structures of 
social inequality.129 Discrimination on this broader picture is not always 
the act of an individual agent who defies principles of equal treatment, 
but can also be the manifestation, through individual action, of past and 
persistent social injustice and inequality.130 On this understanding of what 
discriminatory action is, holding employers liable for discrimination—
both conscious and unconscious—must be understood not as a practice 
of enforcing norms of individual responsibility, but about effecting social 
change and reform. 
Conclusion 
I set out in this Article to explore what might be called a naïve 
question about the legal significance of unconscious bias: Should 
employment discrimination law allow for the imposition of liability based 
on proof of such bias? To reach the merits of this question, I devised a 
thought experiment in which I hypothesized a set of facts (the “Work 
Experience” case) in an employment context and asked whether the 
employer should be held liable for discrimination if we could prove that 
her action was influenced by the operation of implicit bias, even if she 
genuinely believed that she was acting only on the basis of adequate 
reasons. 
I have explained that the argument in favor of holding the employer 
liable in the “Work Experience” case on the basis of her implicit racial 
bias implies a shift in the operative model of discrimination from a 
justificatory conception (in which discrimination is centrally defined by a 
certain kind of inadequacy in an agent’s putative rationale in acting) to a 
causal conception (in which discrimination is defined by the presence of 
a certain kind of causal influence in an action’s psychological etiology). 
Our misgivings about liability for unconscious discrimination can be 
explained, I have argued, by its dependence on the causal conception. 
 
 127. See Levinson, supra note 126, at 417–20. 
 128. Id. at 420. 
 129. Cf. Lawrence, supra note 121, at 322–23 (arguing that an individual’s racism is intertwined 
with society’s belief system). 
 130. Larry Alexander makes a similar observation in discussing the difficulties of drawing a 
meaningful moral distinction between actions based on conscious bias, actions based on unconscious 
bias, and actions based on preferences that are facially neutral but are in fact “tainted” by a causal 
connection to historically discriminatory social structures. See Alexander, supra note 33, at 177–81. 
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Entertaining the normative plausibility of such liability calls forth the 
familiar philosophical tension between viewing an action as the 
determined consequence of antecedent causal conditions that are not 
responsive to the agent’s own judgments, and at the same time holding 
the agent responsible for that action. 
I have suggested that the causal conception of discrimination is 
susceptible to some worries—one having to do with diminishing the 
moral seriousness of the charge of discrimination, and the other with a 
potential instability that might undermine the distinction between 
individual and “societal” discrimination. What we ought to conclude 
from these worries is not entirely clear to me. It does seem, though, that 
if the model of implicit bias really is, as many commentators have 
argued,131 the paradigm of discrimination that will be most relevant to the 
workplace in coming years, then perhaps it is not so naïve after all to ask 
whether the law should adjust accordingly. If this means changing our 
understanding of discrimination from an agent-centered, moralistic 
conception to a predominantly psychosocial, diagnostic one, then 
perhaps our wisest response might be to bite the necessary bullets and 
adopt that latter conception. If unconscious discrimination really is best 
characterized as akin to passing on an infectious disease, then maybe the 
law should approach the problem of such discrimination not in the 
traditional manner of assigning individual responsibility and blame, but 
much more in the manner of addressing an issue of public health.132 
 
 131. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 21, at 3–16; Jolls, supra note 71, at 72–73; Krieger, supra note 2, at 
1164. 
 132. See Lawrence, supra note 121, at 329. 
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